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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Differences Between Genders: A New Outlook
Several years ago, in an attempt to explain the quantitative gap that exists between men and women on university science faculties, Professor
Lawrence Summers proclaimed that there are fewer women than men on
science and math faculties because men and women have different abilities
in these fields.1 A month later, addressing his comments on women and the
sciences, Summers added that the absence of women in scientific fields
arises from present social failings that ought to be corrected.2
Summers‘s explanation of the alleged innate differences between men
and women reflects the prevailing opinion on the absence of women in
scientific fields and the deficit of women inventors.3 The widely held contention posits that there are inborn biological differences between men and
women; women possess more advanced verbal skills and men possess better mathematical and spatial capabilities (known as the difference claim).4
1. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Why Women Are Poor at Science, by Harvard President,
THE
GUARDIAN
(London)
(Jan.
18,
2005,
12:14
PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2005/jan/18/educationsgendergap.genderissues (reporting that Professor Summers intended to stimulate discussion at a conference when
he stated that innate differences between men and women might be one reason that
fewer women succeed in science and math careers, and offered three explanations for
the lack of women in senior positions in science and engineering: (i) a lack of desire to
work long hours because of their responsibilities for their children; (ii) innate differences between males and females; and (iii) the influence of gender discrimination on
academic appointments); see also Lawrence H. Summers, Letter from President Summers on Women and Science, HARVARD UNIV. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 19,
2005), http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/summers_2005/womensci.php (apologizing for not having weighed his comments more carefully after receiving negative
media responses to his comments).
2. See Lawrence H. Summers, Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the
Science & Engineering Workforce, HARVARD UNIV. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 14,
2005), http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/summers_2005/nber.php (explaining
that discrimination and the lack of education are responsible for the scarcity of women
working in science).
3. See Steven Pinker, The Science of Difference, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE
(Feb. 14, 2005), http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/media/2005_02_14_newrepublic
.html (stating that Summers‘s analysis of why there are fewer women in the sciences is
commonplace amongst economists who study gender disparities).
4. See Doreen Kimura, Sex Differences in the Brain, SCI. AM. (May 13, 2002),
available at http://www.changelingaspects.com/Articles/Sex Differences in the Brain Scientific American.htm (adding that recent empirical studies suggest that the effects of
sex hormones on brain organization occur so early in life that evaluating the effect of
experience and enjoyment is even more difficult than previously understood); see also
ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & CAROL N. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES
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According to this contention, people would expect only a small minority of
women to be inventors; thus, the segregation between women and men in
the field of technological-industrial invention is neither coincidental nor the
intentional result of a particular legal structure, but instead the natural consequence of such alleged innate differences. Research examining the differences between men and women, reported in psychological literature,
supports this opinion.5 Incorporated into this widely held contention is the
assumption that even if legal structures facilitated or encouraged women to
own patents, women would remain the minority patent-holders because of
their innate differences. Adoption of this explanation precludes any reason
or incentive to change the social and legal structures for acquiring patents
in a way that would grant women more rights because, under the difference
claim, the result would inextricably remain the same.
The discussion contained in this Article does not deal with the accuracy
of the biological claim that asserts the existence of ―differences‖ between
genders. Rather, the focus is to bring attention to and open channels of discourse regarding the state of gender inequality within the patent field by
analyzing the approaches of various feminist theories to the ―differences‖
between the genders. It will also demonstrate how the current legal mechanisms, as applied in practice, use these differences to maintain the status
quo and restrict women from becoming ―inventors.‖6
In this introductory section, two general feminist approaches to the claim
of gender differences set the stage for a later discussion of the intersection
between gender and patent law. This discussion is followed by a summary
of the contents of the study embodied in this Article, the current findings of
related research, and the significance of such findings.
In contrast to Professor Summers‘s viewpoint, Radical Feminism, the
first of the gender theories discussed, does not accept the paradigm of
gender ―differences,‖ claiming it is a suppressive explanation meant to infuse the world with security and certainty regarding the status quo of tradi351-52 (1974) (listing numerous areas where there has been insufficient empirical research or ambiguous findings comparing men and women such as studies assessing
competitiveness, dominance, compliance, and fear timidity and anxiety in children);
LEONARD SAX, WHY GENDER MATTERS: WHAT PARENTS AND TEACHERS NEED TO
KNOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES 77-114 (2005) (finding
that there are biological differences in the ways boys and girls learn and that separate
groups make different learning styles possible).
5. See DAVID WECHSLER, THE MEASUREMENT AND APPRAISAL OF ADULT
INTELLIGENCE 148 (4th ed. 1958) (explaining that males do better than females in
arithmetic and picture completions and females do better than males in vocabulary on
intelligence tests).
6. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination (1984), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32, 35 (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance] (arguing that law of sex discrimination actually asks to hold
women to a male standard, thus defeating its purpose of treating women as equals).
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tional gender roles.7 Because the differences claim is premised upon natural-inborn characteristics, it precludes criticism and change of the status
quo.8
Professor Catherine MacKinnon emphasizes that the relevant question is
not about the ―differences‖ between the sexes, but rather the ―distribution
of power‖ in accordance to those alleged differences.9 Following the distributive reasoning, the current practice of determining the criteria of Eligible Patent Matters (EPM), which determines what is considered a protected
patent, is, as this Article claims, in accordance with androcentric characteristics, and is therefore neither biological nor evolutionary, but purely political and consequently serves to influence the unequal distribution of rights
and resources in society.10 As such, while the actual existence of real differences between men and women remains unknown, the fact remains that
the female voice is silenced, regardless of whether it is by actual innate differences or imagined ones.11 If genuine female traits exist, they can only
be expressed where there is no fear under conditions of freedom, autonomy, and equality, conditions that fail to exist today. At that point, it will be
possible to examine the laws of invention in a more egalitarian manner.
Until then, according to Radical Feminist theory, the widespread perspective of ―gender as difference‖ merely utilizes gender as an exclusory mechanism stunting the growth of women in general and, for the purposes of
this discussion, as inventors. When acknowledging such circumstances,
the relevant and practical question then becomes, how can women gain
access to those benefits from which they were excluded?
On the other hand, cultural feminism accepts the contention that there
are differences between the sexes, and it praises women‘s differences.12
7. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not by Law Alone: From a Debate with Phyllis Schlafly, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 21, 22 (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, Not by
Law Alone] (arguing that differentiation is a strategy to suppress women, while real
feminism seeks to empower women on their own terms).
8. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
249 (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY] (finding that most
people have a natural tendency to find the logic for existing ―rules‖ and to justify them,
which creates a sense of certainty and reduces the anxiety of the unknown but also paralyzes criticism and change).
9. See MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance, supra note 6, at 34 (arguing that
difference between men and women created their division but men dominated to the
point where women are measured according to their lack of correspondence with men).
10. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC‘Y 635, 638-39
(1983) (claiming that male dominance is the most pervasive power in history because
its point of view is the standard).
11. See MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance, supra note 6, at 44-45 (arguing
that as long as women‘s voices are not heard and sex equality is limited by sex difference, women cannot achieve true equality).
12. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMAN‘S DEVELOPMENT 6 (1982) (arguing that to understand human development, we
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Professor Carol Gilligan describes some of those differences, including traditionally—attributed ―female‖ traits that emphasize support for relationships and traditionally—attributed ―male‖ traits that emphasize hierarchy
and power. The differences attributed to women, according to Gilligan‘s
claim, are neither objective nor neutral because, when viewed critically,
general rules, standards and norms emerge as measures created and calculated according to male traits.13 Any differences possessed by women,
therefore, automatically became exceptions to the norm and being an exception or different has, over time, acquired the meaning of inferiority.
The result is that ―male‖ traits act as discriminative tools disguised as legitimate criteria used to exclude women from receiving the same benefits as
the standard (male).14
Both feminist approaches agree that questioning the differences between
the genders (especially the claim of biological origins) is not necessary to
the gender bias analysis. Gender difference perpetuates the inferiority of
women, excludes women from rights, capital, resources and power sources,
and prevents reform by releasing institutions (and individuals) of any social
and legal responsibility.
As applied today, the differences between the genders serve only as
foundational criteria for a discriminatory definition in the context of defining the benefits and protections of patent law and for distributing those
benefits between the genders. As a result of the way that the difference
claim is used, rather than the difference itself, the definitions of ―invention‖
and ―inventor‖ exclude women from the entitled group of inventors.15 It is
legal mechanisms of this type that are considered and analyzed in this Article
Recognition of this exclusionary mechanism is important because it is
the first step to taking corrective action. Just as the claim of difference is
used to exclude women, legal mechanisms can also be used to change the
resultant discrimination and grant women access to rights and benefits.
One way to accomplish this can be through expanding relevant definitions
to entitle more individuals to patent rights, as explained below.

must take into account the female experience).
13. See id. at 5-6 (finding that theories formerly seen as neutral actually reflect
many biases because people are accustomed to seeing life through men‘s eyes).
14. See id. at 5 (pointing out that theorists have made the male life the norm and
women are fashioned out of male cloth).
15. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 113-15 (2006) (requiring a drawing, detailed description,
model if necessary, and oath that inventor ―believes himself is original and first inventor of the process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or improvement
thereof‖ (emphasis added)).
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B. Gender Analysis of Patent Law: A New Approach
This Article proposes a novel gender analysis of patent law. Until now,
the literature on gender differences and behavioral approaches to science
has been limited, relating mainly to explaining the gap between men and
women in acquiring patents from a sociological perspective. The existing
body of literature discusses the tendency of women to favor less competitive environments and build more collaborative networks.16 Some scholars
have assessed gender differences in studies comparing men‘s and women‘s
achievement patenting in science and found that females are less likely to
patent.17 The question that remains is: ―why?‖ This question of ―why?‖ is
discussed in depth and from a new perspective for the first time below.
The study embodied in this Article relates to the laws of patents. At first
glance, it would seem that intellectual property laws are objective and
gender-neutral. Unlike other areas of the law that deal with gender inequality directly (such as family law or maternity laws), intellectual property
laws, including the laws relating to patenting inventions, do not, on their
face, seem to relate to gender. The legal rules themselves mention neither
women nor men. Instead, the exclusion of women from these laws is concealed and has yet to be the subject of focused discussion. Superficially,
any woman can invent any invention, register a patent, and earn royalties in
a manner equal to that of a man in accordance with the law. The reality,
however, remains quite different. Gilligan wrote that ―active adventure is a
male activity, and that if a woman is to embark on such endeavors, she
must at least dress like a man.‖18 The basic premise of the discussion in
this Article is that the law, including patent law, is neither neutral nor objective.19 It should be noted that this criticism of subjectivity is not the sole
16. See Yu Meng, Women in Patenting: Does Nanotechnology Make a Difference?,
DRUID-DIME ACAD. 5 (Jan. 2010), available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/
viewpaper.php?id=500602&cf=44 (discussing that because of these attributes women
might be more attracted to entering an interdisciplinary field).
17. See, e.g., id. at 17 (calling for scholarly intervention to close the gap in gender
discrimination in the sciences); Waverly W. Ding et al., Gender Differences in Patenting in the Academic Life Science, 313 SCIENCE 665, 665-67 (2006) (finding that women
faculty members patent at about a rate 40% of the rate of men but that there might not
be a measurable gender difference to answer why); Ranier Frietsch et al., GenderSpecific Patterns in Patenting and Publishing, 38 RES. POL‘Y, 590, 594-95 (2009)
(finding that while there has been a strong increase in women‘s contribution to tecnological output in Spain, France, Denmark, Australia, and the U.S., women‘s contributions are still relatively low compared to men, explaining that the availability of entering a specific field in those countries plays a significant role).
18. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 13.
19. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 133-212
(1997) (discussing the principle of neutrality); GEORGE SHER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY:
PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 20-175 (1997) (evaluating the idea of complete government neutrality and arguing that instead of neutrality the government should promote a
certain idea of ―good‖); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 739, 744 (1982) (claiming that objectivity recognizes a role for the subjective).
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property of feminists: it is a logical and critical schema that has been used
in the past by other critical legal studies.20 Feminism is one part of this
skeptical tradition, although it does include its own criticisms of the law.21
In this instance, feminist theoreticians stress the claim that the legal principles in place can lead to discrimination against women by both creating
and perpetuating gender gaps.22
Accordingly, the law of invention is neither objective nor neutral but
contains a built-in gender bias. This research is premised upon the notion
that a legal analysis, based on a feminist perspective, will contribute to understanding the phenomenon of women‘s exclusion from owning intellectual property rights in inventions and patents. The research addresses Professor Wright‘s statement: ―Intellectual property generally is one of the few
areas of law that seems to have escaped feminist analysis.‖23
The reader should note that, although understanding the legal issues is
fundamental to comprehension of the processes that excludes women from
inventing, a holistic understanding of the phenomena also includes consideration of social and legal factors. While this Article focuses on one aspect
of gender discrimination in the context of patent law, the paucity of women
among the owners of intellectual property rights in inventions and patents
is complex and should be analyzed from various perspectives. A proper
analysis also requires a discussion of both the statistics regarding the number of women inventors and the problems that arise from the encounter between women and the workplace. Each of these discussions has been explored in separate articles.24
20. See Owen M. Fiss, What is Feminism?, 18 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 5, 14 (1993)
(describing that objectivity in the law is a product of the public‘s ―false consciousness‖
and serves as a tool for the continued control of the oppressed, making rights the property of one group, while denying them to another; and describing the critical legal studies (CLS) movement that developed in the late 1970s, which applied this critical paradigm to free-market theory and legal principles in general).
21. See MACKINNON, Not by Law Alone, supra note 7, at 26 (arguing the law as
written has helped women progress very little because it has been a male sphere);
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 8, at 161-62 (stating that the
law sees and treats women the way men see and treat women).
22. See generally Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 1279 (1977) (arguing that the differences between males and females are real
and significant, and that society needs to revalue traditional female occupations as
equivalent to ―male‖ activities); Joanne Conaghan, Tort Law And Feminist Critique, in
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 2003 175 (M.D.A. Freeman ed., vol. 56, 2003) (disagreeing with comments made by Professor Gary Schwartz, and arguing that feminist scholarship in the area of torts is not thin in substance and narrow in scope, but is richer and
deeper than first impression).
23. See Shelley Wright, A Feminist Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art, 7
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 59, 64 (1994) (calling for additional research on the presence and
absence of women within legal protective contexts, particularly in the patent field).
24. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Exclusion of Women Inventors from the Meeting
Point Between Patents as Intellectual Property, Work and Feminine Discourse, in
STUDIES IN LAW, GENDER AND FEMINISM 357 (Daphne Barak-Erez et al. eds., 2007)
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This Article analyzes the legal structures of patent law and is built upon
the notion that the other, extra-legal explanations alone are insufficient and
unable to provide the whole explanation for the exclusion of women inventors. This Article, for the first time, analyzes the U.S. Supreme Court‘s and
the international interpretation of the definition of EPM, from the gender
perspective. This Article concludes that where the definition of EPM is
narrow, it does not include ―women‘s life experiences‖ and, therefore, acts
to exclude women from receiving patents.
II. EXCLUSION OF WOMEN INVENTORS BY THE NARROW DEFINITION OF
A PATENTABLE INVENTION
A. Eligible Patent Matter (EPM) as a Filtering Factor
Intellectual property laws provide important sources of access to concrete and intellectual assets, capital, rights and power.25 Recognition of the
continued and increasing contribution of intellectual property to innovation
is well established. Patent ownership plays an important role acting as an
incentive for advancement that inevitably leads to economic growth. As
such, the number of patent applications and grants has grown significantly
over recent years, as has the type and breadth of inventions that can be patented.26
The laws of intellectual property make it possible for applicants and other people who have access to the patent system to benefit from basic, existential values including liberty, autonomy, and security while developing
and actualizing their personhood.27 From this point of departure, it is no
(explaining the obstacles preventing entry to positions that might, in the long run, lead
to developing patents, and the structural conflict between motherhood and work that
attribute to the low number of woman inventors who own intellectual property in their
inventions).
25. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the
Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV 239, 257-58 (1994) (defining property
rights as a system of rules that control access to scarce resources which have the ability
to satisfy human needs and desires.); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Shaking the Foundations of
Patentable Subject Matter, Preliminary Discussion Draft, PROGRAM ON INFO. JUSTICE
AND
INTELLECTUAL
PROP.
2
(Apr.
2,
2008),
available
at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/download.cfm?downloadfile=2E900771-B742DD30-1B56F85D889A053E&typename=dmFile&fieldname=filename (arguing the
restriction of some male-dominated inventions, including mathematical algorithms,
products of nature, and mental processes, impedes the process of technology).
26. See, e.g., Wendy H. Schacht, Patent Reform: Issues in the Biomedical and
Software Industries, 27 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP., 153, 153 (2007) (stating that these
results show the importance of intellectual property to U.S. innovation and have led to
Congress‘s interest in reforming the existing system).
27. See Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45
ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 372-73 (2003) (noting that even the definition of property rights is
controversial, and presenting a historical survey of the various definitions given for
property).
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wonder that the laws of property and intellectual property have served as
the focal point of a philosophical-legal-social debate. However, intellectual
property laws have not yet been subject to major feminist analysis. When
viewed within the context of gender, the reality reveals that women scientists are less productive than men scientists. This has a significant and negative impact on women‘s career advancement by creating and perpetuating
inequalities in the relevant fields, such as reward and cognition.
This Article emphasizes the claim that patent law does not provide protection for all products and processes equally, but only for those products
or processes that the law itself defines as worthy of protection (resulting in
the exclusion of women). In other words, there are built-in legal filters in
patent law. One of these accepted ―filters‖ in the field is the principle of
EPM. According to this principle, a patentable invention is one that complies with certain criteria, which are established by the law. Inter alia,
these include the requirement that the invention be ―new and useful.‖28
The first argument, described below, illuminates the phenomenon of how
the use of the narrow definition of a patentable invention acts to exclude
women. A comparison is made between the narrow definition of an ―invention‖ that is prevalent in international treaties and the long-standing
broader U.S. approach.
Until recently, it was possible to identify at least two principal legal approaches to defining an invention: (i) the narrow definition, and (ii) the
broad definition. The narrow approach is found in the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)29 and has been
adopted by many countries, such as Israel.30 This definition includes technological and industrial aspects as threshold conditions for recognizing an
invention as patentable. As explained below, this definition, in actual practice, excludes women as a result of its focus on industrial and technological
matters.
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (allowing those who invent or discover any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or improvement to
obtain a patent after meeting the requirements in this title).
29. Part II – Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual
property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/
t_agm3_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
30. See Patent Law, 5727-1967 (Isr.) (defining an invention under Israeli law);
Singapore Patent Act of 1994, Chap. 221, §13 (1) (1995) (defining an invention as
something that ―[i]s capable of industrial application‖); TAIWAN PATENT LAW, Art. 21
(2003) (defining an invention as a highly creative technical innovation and the grant of
the patent for an invention depends whether it ―advances technology significantly
beyond the state of art at the time of filing‖); Japan Patent Law 121, Art. 2(1) (1999)
(Japan) (including a reference to the technical application of ideas and defining an invention as ―the highly advanced creation of technical ideas by which a law of nature is
utilized‖). See generally WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
(Dennis Campbell ed., 2009) [hereinafter WORLD IP RIGHTS] (comparing different patent law legislations from around the world).
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The broad approach is best illustrated by U.S. patent law and its traditional interpretation of patentable matter, which is not limited by technological or industrial requirements, and includes a wider range of inventions.
The definition adopted by U.S. law is broader than the TRIPS agreement
definition and, therefore, more accepting of the varied occupations of
women and their creations.
Recently, however, and to the detriment of women in the sciences, this
approach was challenged by U.S. courts on varying levels. The Supreme
Court, however, in a traditionalist form, most recently rejected the trend of
moving lower level U.S. courts toward a narrower approach.31 This narrowing trend can be seen, for example, in In re Bilski by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which will be discussed below.32 The recent struggle in U.S. courts to abandon the broader approach and adopt the
narrowing trend is a matter of concern. As the definition of EPM increases
its focus on products or processes that contain only mechanical, technical
and industrial aspects, it becomes more likely that the definition serves to
exclude women from becoming inventors. Therefore, these courts‘ decisions need to be addressed from a gender perspective.
B. The Narrow Approach: The Technological Definition of Invention in the
TRIPS Agreement
The most significant international treaties relating to patents have
adopted the narrow definition of what is a patentable invention, ―patents
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step
and are capable of industrial application.‖33
This definition as it appears in the TRIPS treaty is not atypical or isolated. For instance, the European Patent Convention (EPC) also takes the
industrial approach in defining what constitutes an invention: ―European
patents shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of industrial application.‖34
31. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (holding that the Bilski
Business Methods patent was rejected because of the unpatentability of abstract ideas
precedents).
32. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (ruling that the Bilski
Business Methods patent was properly rejected using the machine or transfer test provided by the Supreme Court and clarified by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals).
33. See WORLD IP RIGHTS, supra note 30 (emphasis added) (noting that while
TRIPS, section 27 prohibits discrimination, the prohibition focuses on the place of invention, not the gender of the inventor).
34. European Patent Convention, art. 52(1), opened for signature Oct. 5 1973 (entered into force Oct. 7, 1977), available at http://www.european-patentoffice.org/legal/epc/e/ma1.html#CVN (precluding from the definition of invention; aesthetic creations, discoveries, scientific theories, mathematical methods, playing games
or doing business, computer programs and methods for treating humans and animals).
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These structures and treaties of international intellectual property law are
centralized and the wording used in international treaties is then translated
literally into the amended legislation of the various signatory countries. As
a consequence, countries that utilize the TRIPS definition adopted similar
definitions that require a technological application as a prior condition for
registering a patent and for receiving the protection of patent laws.35
The technological character of an invention has therefore become a central element in the question: what is a patentable invention? As one could
attest, ―[p]atent law is technology-neutral in theory,‖ but, when taking a
deeper view – ―it is technology-specific in application.‖36
Intellectual property rights, in general, and patent law in particular, are
justified primarily on the foundation of a utilitarian rationale that is expressed in the U.S. Constitution.37 According to this rationale, in order to
encourage progress in fields that are important to humanity, a social contract is entered into between the public and the inventor. In this transaction, exclusive rights are granted, for a limited period, to whoever enriches
the world with innovative intellectual products (or is likely to move the
process forward).38 Intellectual property laws are intended to act as an incentive factor for inventors to continue to enrich humanity with new and
important intellectual products.
In this respect, many questions may arise regarding the consensus surrounding advancing science in general, and technology and industry in particular.39 Consider these questions: What is science? Who defines science?
35. See Patent Law, 5727-1967 (Isrl.) (defining a patentable product as a ―product
or a process, which is new and useful, can be used in industry or agriculture‖ and includes an inventive step which was defined as ―a step which does not, to an average
skilled person, appear obvious in the light of information published before the application date.‖).
36. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156, (2002) (explaining that the standards were designed
to be broad in order to better be able to adapt flexibly to new technologies, and encompass ―anything under the sun made by man‖).
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (―To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖).
38. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 36, at 1156 (explaining that while the rules
were designed at a time when inventions were all mechanical, the Federal Circuit has
applied those rules in a way that has effectively created different standards for different
industries); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL. STUD. 325, 344-51 (1989) (describing the nature and
scope of copyright protections); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely
Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 495 (2003) (distinguishing expressive
works, and the marketing thereof analogizing to a record company who is protected by
copyright laws for all its productions and hence enabled to earn enough money to balance the risk of developing new, potentially unsuccessful, records and reaping the benefits of the successful records).
39. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 36, at 1156 (arguing that a divergence has become apparent between patent rules and their application to different industries).
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What fields are considered part of the definition of science (for instance, is
social science included)? What are the results of this definition? Are technology and industry the only fields or the primary fields that enhance human welfare? Who gains from directing the benefits derived from patent
law to these particular fields? Who is excluded by this definition? Isn‘t the
contribution of the excluded parties no less significant and important?
Would the contribution be made without the patent mechanism that provides monopolistic property rights?
The discussion below, however, does not focus on the question of
whether the aim of promoting science, industry and technological advancement are worthy, but rather, on its gender implication, whether the
criteria are androcentric and whether the elements of the definition lead to a
discriminatory outcome, thereby illegitimatizing the criteria.40 From the
perspective of gender, this narrowed definition of a patentable invention
reflects a ―masculine model.‖ The definition promotes and perpetuates
characteristics that are attributed primarily to ―male‖ products neither considering nor legitimatizing the other, differing, ―female voice.‖
Scholars attribute women‘s marginalization and exclusion to the ongoing
dominating masculine epistemology in modern science, and argue that
science could benefit from integrating women as well as their differing holistic and contextual methodologies.41 Some scholars, however, attempt to
attribute this phenomenon to the influence of stereotypes about capabilities
and human capital or to gender-related preferences and attitudes towards
competition. Indeed, these theories imply that women prefer newly ―uncrowed‖ or ―feminine‖ niches (where women are concentrated) over, fields
traditionally dominated by men. Compared to their male colleagues, women scientists are thus concentrated in fewer fields, and their inventions are
limited to these fields.42
Moreover, an additional hurdle exists making it even more difficult for
those (female) inventors to succeed in fields other than technology and in40. See Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833,
835 (2000) (claiming that overcoming ―simple discrimination‖ is a meta-value and,
therefore, a principle that is important to keep without considering cost or balancing
various solutions).
41. See Meng, supra note 16, at 3, 5 (noting that women gain only forty percent of
patents that their male counterparts do and women‘s research approach is inherently
comprehensive).
42. See id. (arguing that traditional disciplines rigidly adhere to the problems and
methods defined by male authorities); see also Diana Rhoten & Stephanie Pfirman,
Women in Interdisciplinary Science: Exploring Preferences and Consequences, 36
RESEARCH POLICY 56, 59 (2007) (analyzing theories explaining why women are more
drawn to interdisciplinary research than their male counterparts); Elizabeth Bird, Disciplining the Interdisciplinary: Radicalism and the Academic Curriculum, 32 BRIT. J.
SOC. EDUC. 463, 464 (2001) (describing the role and growth of women‘s participation
in interdisciplinary studies and noting its steady decline and commenting that women
may no longer be the minority in colleges and universities).
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dustry. The burden of proving that inventions in fields other than technology and industry comply with the legal definition of an invention lies on
the inventor, and in such ―alternative‖ fields, this proof is neither assured
nor simple.
Considering the above, it appears that, according to the international definition, the law regarding patents is intended to facilitate inventions of a
technological or industrial nature and offer them better protection over other inventions. By adding the technological requirement as a condition for
approving a patent, when it is well-known that there are huge gaps between
men and women in these fields and without paying proper attention to the
inevitable outcomes of enforcing this definition—the flagrant exclusion of
women inventors—the definition of EPM becomes clearly problematic in
the field of gender relations.
C. The Expansive Approach in the U.S. Law: New and Useful Process vs.
Machine Test
The United States, in contrast to the widely held international approach,
has explicitly opposed the definition set forth in TRIPS and has historically
insisted instead on a broader approach in law.43 This approach, in place today, supports a broad definition of the EPM and is anchored in both law
and precedent.44
35 U.S.C. 101 Inventions patentable.
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the condi45
tions and requirements of this title.

A plain text reading reveals that the definition of ―inventions patentable‖
includes neither ―in all fields of technology‖ nor ―industrial applications‖
as a threshold criteria.46
The language of the law reflects an attitude that emerged from the U.S.
Constitution, which states that the exclusive protection granted to inventors
is intended, ―to promote the progress of science and useful arts:‖
U.S. Constitution, Art I § 8:
To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respec43. See Vincent Chiappetta, TRIP-ping Over Business Method Patents, 37 VAND.
J.TRANSNAT‘L L. 181, 182 (2004) (noting that the United States has been expanding its
definition of patents and has added business methods to its patentable inventions definition).
44. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
46. See Chiappetta, supra note 43, at 184 (arguing the additions to the areas covered under patentable inventions is imprecise and subject to heated debate).
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47

The constitution does not claim that ―science and useful arts‖ must have
a technological or industrial aspect. Promoting human welfare and
progress can instead find expression in broader areas, including the less
technical areas of education and business.
The crowning glory of broadly defining inventions has been the U.S.
courts‘ recognition of patent protection for ―Business Methods.‖48 These
broad encompassing rulings have resulted in a substantial expansion of the
U.S. patent system and a lessening of its self-limitation to the technical applications only.
It should be stressed that this broad interpretation of the law in the United States, even if not intended to improve the number of women inventors
and despite being subject to criticism,49 inadvertently may serve to contribute to increasing the number of women inventors and may be moving toward the important goal of narrowing the gender gap in patent law. This
will be especially true if the definition is expanded to include other equality-promoting interpretations, as proposed below, like endorsing female life
experience products and methods as patentable.
In this way, U.S. law is distinguished by its broad and flexible interpretation of what is considered EPM, like its less conspicuous emphasis on the
technology and the absence of a list of social exceptions.50 By embracing a
broader definition, the U.S. legal system affords greater protection to the
female life experience, avoids limiting protection to only male inventions,
and results in an increased number of women inventors.

47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
48. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228-29 (2010) (rejecting the Bilski Business Methods

application as unpatentabile because it was an abstract idea and emphasizing, once
again, the adoption of the broad approach by stating that the statute acknowledges that
there may be a business methods patent); see also State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing the recognition of Business Methods as patentable).
49. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad
For Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (2000) (regarding
business method patents); Chiappetta, supra note 43, at 192 (arguing that the competitive arts do not benefit from the patent model); Andre J. Porter, Should Business Method Patents Continue to Be Patentable?, 29 S.U. L. REV. 225, 225 (2002) (discussing
the rising importance of business methods patents since the advent of the internet);
Brian P. Biddinger, Limiting the Business Method Patent: A Comparison and Proposed
Alignment of European, Japanese and United States Patent Law, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
2523, 2524 (2001) (pointing out that how technology is defined has become an increasingly difficult problem).
50. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining inventions patentable as ―[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the
conditions and requirement of this title‖); see also R. CARL MOY, MOY‘S WALKER ON
PATENTS § 5:4 (4th ed. 2010) (describing that the statute is likely the foundation for the
broader interpretation of ―invention‖).
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This broader approach is illustrated by the recognition that the U.S. system of patent law has historically given credit to inventions originating in
occupations where women have been more dominant and fields where
women traditionally were and are more likely to contribute to increasing
the general welfare. Take for example, a pediatric speech therapist that
wants to benefit from patent law protection for a diagnostic method that she
invented. According to the narrow approach, in order for her invention to
merit protection, the invention requires a technological anchor, such as a
computer-based tool. Under the narrow approach, this invention might not
be entitled to the protection of patent law and is unlikely to benefit from
any other protection.51 Conversely, under the broader interpretation a nontechnological invention, such as a speech therapy diagnostic tool, may be
recognized as patentable.52
The fields wherein women tend to contribute to human welfare are those
in which women are dominant, active, and creative. For example, the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has identified a new field
of ―social inventions,‖ as a field that benefits from women‘s work.53 A
―social invention‖ is a new imaginative solution to social problems or to
unsatisfied social needs, such as a new method to improve the quality of
life or a new organizational structure.
Another example presents itself when women, as educators, develop methods or tools for improving teaching and learning abilities or as psychologists create diagnostic techniques. Assuming that therapeutic methods are
not an exception, the broad approach, unlike the narrow one, is likely to
recognize these innovations and thereby protect inventions that reflect the
activities where women are currently dominant.54 Therapeutic and educational methods under the narrow approach, however, are not adequately
protected. There is no doubt that it is less difficult, in actual practice, to
obtain patent protection for such developments if the invention is related to
a technological application.55

51. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
52. See DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2-26 (1996) (noting that the U.S. Patent office indicated
that therapeutic-medical treatment methods are patentable if they meet the process and
the conditions of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness).
53. See William Hartston, The Institute for Social Inventions: Feeling Lucky,
Punk?, THE INDEPENDENT (London) March 10, 1994, available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/the-institute-for-social-inventionsfeeling-lucky-punk-1428142.html (describing the results and general application for the
field of social inventions).
54. But see MOY, supra note 50, at § 5:4 (noting the divided opinions about the defensibility of human involvement for patents).
55. See id. at 5-15 (―Speaking generally, there is a strong consensus that the patent
system currently exists to foster the development of applied technology . . . .‖).
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The flexible, broad definition customary in the United States, while improving the narrow approach, is itself not free from gender perspective criticism. Despite the flexibility and expansion of the definition, effectively
including more women inventors, large areas of female activity remain excluded from the definition of ―invention.‖ The developing legal precedents, which are not guided by a desire to promote equality, have influenced the way in which cases are decided. Many of the inventions, which
have been recognized as patentable, are in fields where men are more dominant.
D. The Bilski Case: Broad vs. Narrow Approach
Even though U.S. courts have expanded the applications protected by patent law to include fields that are neither technological nor industrial, the
technological and industrial demands derived from the international definitions that include the phrases, ―in all fields of technology‖ and ―industrial
application‖56 has recently influenced the traditional American conception
of patents.57 In other words, the law is not totally immune to the recent
trend. Some voices explicitly promote the inclusion of machine and tangible requirements in U.S. patent law and reject Business Methods as being
patentable.58 Coupled with the extensive criticism of U.S. courts for recognizing patentable Business Methods, this has led to a retreat from the
broader U.S. definition of a patentable invention and an about-face toward
including a Machine Test as a threshold requirement. This trend is clearly
evident in the In re Bilski U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit deci-

56. See Part II – Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
trips_e/t_agm3_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) (stating that the patentable subject
matter includes any inventions in any technology fields).
57. See MOY, supra note 50, at § 5:4 (discussing the existence of judicial exceptions that limit the patent law system to matters where technology has been applied);
Biddinger, supra note 54, at 2524 (providing that traditionally patents were meant to
protect advancements in technology). But see Dreyfuss, supra note 49, at 264-65 (explaining that the Congress and American people started to recognize that information
products are a large part of the economy, appreciate the value of intellectual work, and
support the creative community producing such work with intellectual property rights);
Chiappetta, supra note 50, at 182 n.2 (explaining that the United States has recently
broadened the scope of patentable subject matter such as including business method
patenting); Porter, supra note 49, at 225 (noting that ―business method patents have
taken center stage of discussions regarding patentable subject matter‖).
58. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comm‘n, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1359-60 (affirming
the principle that for a claimed invention to be a patentable subject matter, the invention must produce a useful, concrete and tangible result); MOY, supra note 55, at § 5:30
(stating that change in approach to the business methods occurred as a result of them
being anchored in computer technology); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 43, at
1156 (arguing that the U.S. patent law, while it is technology-neutral in theory, tends to
be lenient in granting patents to computer technology, compared to other fields such as
biotechnology).
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sion59 (the trend was later overturned by the Supreme Court).60
The Bilski case deals with the question of whether or not a Business Method can be recognized as a patentable invention. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held the narrow opinion.61 The ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which favored a broader approach in relation
to the EPM definition.62 For the purposes of this Article, it should be noted
that the Bilski decisions, although relevant to the gender divide, did not
consider gender issues in any way, shape, or form.
Although the Federal Circuit‘s majority decision was rejected by the Supreme Court, we cannot ignore the voices favoring the narrow approach.
All former instances and almost all of the Federal Circuit judges sought to
adopt the narrow approach. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, like the Federal Circuit, denied the patent because the Business Method in question
was an unpatentable abstract idea.63 Moreover, the Supreme Court did not
reject the narrow approach totally, ruling that by ―disapproving an exclusive machine-or-transformation test, we by no means foreclose the Federal
Circuit‘s development of other limiting criteria that further the purposes of
the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text.‖64
The Federal Circuit‘s decision represents the ―masculine‖ narrow patent
approach. The majority opinion held that a claim process is a Patent Eligible Matter if (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus; or (2) it
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.65 Moreover,
the majority concluded that this ―machine or transformation test‖ is the sole
test for determining patent eligibility of a ―process‖ under section 101 of
the patent law.66 The court applied the test and held that the application in
question was not patent eligible.67 The definition of EPM was thereby contracted (until the decision was overturned) by adopting ―masculine‖ thre59. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that purported
transformation of business risks or other abstractions are not physical objects, thus do
not represent a transformation of an object into a different state, which is required to be
patentable).
60. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010) (ruling that the ‗machineor-transformation‘ test is only a factor in determining whether an invention is patentable).
61. See id. (pointing out that the Federal Circuit misinterpreted the machine-ortransformation test as exclusive or exhaustive).
62. See id. at 3229 (explaining that business methods may be within the patentable
subject matter according to the Patent Act).
63. See id. at 3229-30 (explaining that abstract ideas are not patentable).
64. Id. at 3231.
65. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining the rationale behind the machine-or-transformation test).
66. See id. at 961 (rejecting the ―physical steps‖ test).
67. See id. at 963 (holding that business methods cannot meet the test because they
are not physical objects or substances).
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shold criteria, such as the use of a ―machine,‖ or the ―transformation‖ test
that applies only to physical substances and the test requiring a tangible,
physical object. For example, in describing the decision‘s criteria for a patentable invention, Judge Paul R. Michel wrote:
The machine-or-transformation test is a two-branched inquiry; an applicant may show . . . that his claim is tied to a particular machine, or . . .
[show] that his claim transforms an article. [A]bstractions cannot meet
the test because they are not physical objects or substances, and they are
68
not representative of physical objects or substances.‖

This narrow interpretation is not derived from the language of the law.69
According to the Supreme Court‘s later decision, the law includes a list of
requirements that can be interpreted as alternative requirements.70 Influenced by the global narrowing trend, the Federal Circuit gave precedence
to certain terms (such as ―machine‖) over others, making ―new and useful
art‖ subordinate to the ―machine‖ test and interpreting terminology that
could be considered neutral, such as ―transformation,‖ as including a threshold requirement of ―physical and tangible.‖
Other judicial opinions in the decision, both in the majority and in the
minority (except for Judge Pauline Newman), supported this stance.71 For
example, in a dissenting opinion Judge Haldane Robert Mayer wrote that
―the patent system is intended to protect and promote advances in science
and technology . . . .‖72 Further, he claimed that the famous State Street
and AT&T decisions recognizing business methods as patentable inventions
should be overruled.73 Judge Newman was the only one who disagreed. In
her dissenting opinion, Judge Newman wrote that the ―court‘s redefinition
is contrary to statute and to explicit rulings of the Supreme Court and this
court.‖74
Judge Newman did not directly refer to the gender aspect, but her words
are useful in promoting patent protection for women‘s fields of activity.
Reading her words in light of principles outlined in this Article leads to a
renewed understanding of the expansive definition of ―invention‖ against a
68. Id. at 961-62.
69. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (emphasizing that courts should not read into pa-

tent laws limitations and conditions not expressed by the legislature).
70. See id. at 3227-28 (explaining that the list of patentable subject matter is
phrased in the disjunctive).
71. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 974 (stating that the need to accommodate technological
change does not force courts to rewrite the relevant statute as to include human activities that do not involve machines).
72. Id. at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 1000-01 (explaining that before State Street was decided, this court
correctly held that patents were designed to protect technological innovations, not abstract ideas).
74. Id. at 977 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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background of gender. Adopting Judge Newman‘s position in line with
keeping to the traditional U.S. approach makes it possible to recognize
women‘s work as eligible for patent protection. A narrower definition
would exclude both the inventors of business methods and the women
creating in non-technical fields such as education and psychology. Judge
Newman further explained:
The court . . . by redefining the word ―process‖ in the patent statute . . .
exclude[s] all processes that do not transform physical matter or that are
not performed by machine. The court thus excludes many . . . kinds of
inventions . . . . The Supreme Court has consistently confirmed the constitutional and legislative purpose of providing a broadly applicable incentive to commerce and creativity, through this system of limited exclu75
sivity.

The Supreme Court, in accordance with Judge Newman‘s dissent, overturned the Federal Circuit and ruled in favor of the broader approach, going
so far as to state that the statute itself acknowledges that there may be a
business methods patent.76 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the
Federal Circuit‘s interpretation was inconsistent with the plain language of
the Constitution and the law. Under 35 U.S.C. § 100(b), the term ―process‖
means ―process, art or method, and includes the new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.‖77 The
Supreme Court explained that they are unaware of any ordinary, contemporary, common meaning of ―process‖ that would require it to be tied to a
machine or transformation of articles.78 However, although the Supreme
Court overturned the Federal Circuit‘s rationale, they affirmed its final decision in rejecting Bilski‘s Business Method as patentable. The Supreme
Court concluded that the application was rejected on the basis of unpatentability of abstract ideas.79
This Article highlights the importance of re-examining the definition of
―invention‖ in patent laws worldwide. In most countries, the definition of
―invention‖ emphasizes the elements relating to machines, industry, and
technology. In its current form, this definition favors men and fails to reflect the contribution of women to human welfare. One suggestion is to
75. Id. at 976.
76. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3222 (noting that applicable statutory defenses indicate

that business methods are ―simply one kind of ‗method‘‖).
77. See id. at 3225 (explaining that Congress intended to give patent laws a wide
scope).
78. See id. at 3221-22 (noting that the machine-or-transformation test was never
considered exhaustive or exclusive).
79. See id. at 3231 (rejecting the ―machine or transformation test‖ as the sole test
for determining that a product or a process is patententable, and ruling that the language of 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 does not disallow all business methods from being patented).
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change the definition of EPM to include inventions created from women‘s
life experiences in areas such as education, psychology, social work, and
relevant Business Methods.
Although the Supreme Court adopts this notion, it is important to note
that the Federal Circuit ruled otherwise and that movement toward a narrowing approach remains prevalent. Limiting the definition of EPM by attributing greater importance to technology and industry is effectively
equivalent to adopting the narrow TRIPS definition and is very undesirable
from the perspective of gender equality.
E. Supporting Data: How Many Women Inventors are There?80
Statistical data supports feminist criticism of the narrow EPM definition
because it reveals the near exclusion of women in a narrow approach patent
legal system. To date, only partial statistics are available regarding the
number of women inventors around the world.81 As set forth in this Article, while women inventors are a minority of all inventors in the fields
examined in this study, they are an especially small minority in countries
that adopt the narrow approach.82
The Israeli legal system is an adequate example of the connection between the narrow approach to EPM and the deficit of women inventors. In
Israel, the narrow definition of an invention, translated literally from the
TRIPS agreement prevails:
Israeli Patent Law, Section 3:
―Patentable invention‖ is defined as an ―invention, in any field of tech83
nology. . . which is capable of industrial application.‖

The low number of women inventors in Israel makes a good case study
80. In this study, ―inventor‖ refers to (independent) women inventors. The research focuses on the proprietary sense of the words ―woman inventor,‖ and not on describing the woman inventor working in an invention-rich field. The words are not arbitrary, they are derived from the central discourse on women‘s exclusion from
proprietary rights and, therefore, from the main channels that lead to resources, power,
control, welfare, honor, self-fulfillment, etc. See generally How Many Women Inventors are There?, ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blwomen
inventors.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
81. See generally id. (showing that, for the sources do not clarify their use of the
term ―women inventor,‖ it is likely that they also include women inventors who do own
property rights to their inventions).
82. See Frietsch et al., supra note 17, at 594-95 (stating that during the span of
2003-2005, the relative contribution of women in patent applications averaged around
8%, but finding an increase in the number of women inventors in the pharmaceutical
and bio-technology fields); Patricia Carter-Ives, Patent and Trademark Innovations of
Black Americans and Women, 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC‘Y 108, 113-14 (1980) (noting a 1935
study, which indicated that women received approximately 15,000 of 2,100,000 issued
patents); Thomas Frey, A Study of Women Inventors, FUTURISTSPEAKER.COM (Aug. 4,
2008), http://www.futuristspeaker.com/2008/08/a-study-of-women-inventors/ (reporting that in 2002, 10.9% of all patents were named with women inventors).
83. Patent Law, 5727-1976 (Isr.).
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because Israel has a well-developed patent industry and ranks highly in
terms of the number of patents granted per capita.84
Research done for a previous study found that in 2000-2005,85 in Israel,86
the number of Israeli women inventors who applied for patents in Israel
was only 1.9% out of all applicants (including corporations).87 The ratio of
female inventors to male inventors, excluding the corporate group,88 was
5.95%89 during the same period. To look at the figures in a different light,
in thirty-six out of the sixty months examined, not one single woman applied for a patent, as the owner of its rights. In the remaining months, only
a few (one to three) women inventors, who have property rights over the
patent, submitted applications that were accepted.
Comparing Israel‘s statistics with the partial data available from the
United States, which uses a broader interpretation approach to EPM, the
U.S. clearly shows a significantly higher percentage (more than double) of
women inventors.90
To address the technological industries in particular, research published
in 2010 on women inventors in nanotechnology showed that women encompassed 11.2% of all inventors in this field. Furthermore, the percentage of patents granted to entire research teams that included a minimum of
one female inventor was 16.7%.91
The Patent Statistics Reports section of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTMT) website compiles reports based on several categories92 in84. The
International
Patent
System
in
2008,
WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/activity/pct_2008.html#P219_13270 (last visited Oct. 20,
2010).
85. See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 24, at 359 (studying applications that were received and accepted by the Israel Patent Office during a defined period, based on data
published in the Patent and Trademark Record).
86. See id. (explaining that only patent applications that Israelis filed with the
Israeli Patent Office are included).
87. See id. at 357-59 (looking at applications which were submitted by the owner
of its rights).
88. See id. at 359 (including commercial and other organizations, such as hospitals
and universities or related corporations that filed patent applications in their names,
which were accepted in Israel at the time).
89. See id. at 357 (providing research showing that employee women inventors
generally work as part of a team).
90. See How Many Women Inventors Are There?, supra note 80 (discussing the
first female American patent holder and estimating that in the United States, approximately 20% of all inventors are female); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF.,
DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, PATENT COUNTS BY CLASS BY YEAR (2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/cbcby.htm#PartA1-1 (supplying only partial data because
the U.S. Patent Office does not ask applicants to identify themselves by gender).
91. See Meng, supra note 16, at 12 (explaining that the percentage of patents
granted to male research teams is twice as large).
92. See Calendar Year Patent Statistics (January 1 to December 31) General Patent Statistics Reports Available for Viewing, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
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cluding one statistical report concerning women inventors.93 The report
states that the ―percentage of patents granted within ownership category
which have at least one women inventor, American origin, was more than
10% in 1998.‖94 The percentage today should be higher because the number of women inventors increased five-fold in the twenty years covered by
the study.95 Another study reported approximately 20% women inventors.96
There is also data showing that the percentage of female inventors is
higher in areas of non-classical technology, such as biology, than in mechanical and electronic fields.97
U.S. origin utility patents pertaining to chemical technologies have the
highest percentage of women.98 Utility patents have been roughly divided
into chemical, electrical and mechanical technology categories based on
their primary or ―original‖ classification within the U.S. Patent Classification System (USPCS).99 A study conducted on this basis found that patents
pertaining to chemical technologies have the highest rate of participation
by women inventors:100 ―[N]early half of the U.S. origin woman-inventor
patents issued during the 1977 to 1996 period pertain to chemical technologies, while 36.2 percent pertain to mechanical technologies, and only 14.3
percent pertain to electrical technologies.‖101 The percentage of U.S. origin
patents compares somewhat positively with the percentages for France and
Sweden.102
When sorted by category, a review of the number of applications submithttp://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm#by_invt (last visited Oct.
20, 2010) (including studies titled Patent Counts by Class and Year, Independent Inventors, and Prolific Inventors Receiving Utility Patents, 1988-1997).
93. See generally U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., BUTTONS
TO BIOTECH: U.S. PATENTING BY WOMEN, 1977 TO 1996 (1999) [hereinafter BUTTONS
TO BIOTECH], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/wom
98.pdf (showing ownership of U.S. origin woman-inventor patents from 1977 to 1998).
94. See id. at Appendix Table 4-1 (showing that in 1998, only 10.8 percent of U.S.
patents inventors were received by U.S.-resident women).
95. See id. at 8 (completing the study in 1996).
96. See How Many Women Inventors are There?, supra note 80 (distinguishing unclearly between independent inventors and women employee-inventors).
97. See BUTTONS TO BIOTECH, supra note 93, at 11, figure 4 (separating patents
into categories of utility, design, plant, and other).
98. Id.
99. See id. (acknowledging that less than 0.1 percent of patents are currently not
classified under this method).
100. See id. at 12 (depicting the study‘s findings concerning the annual share of U.S.
Origin Patents which have a women inventor, by technology).
101. See id at 11-13, figure 5 (demonstrating that the categories with the lowest percentage of woman-inventor patents are brakes, fluid-pressure and analogous brake systems, and joints and connections, each at zero percent).
102. Id. at 8.
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ted for patents also support the connection between the narrow vs. broad
approach and its effects on women. In countries where the definition of a
patentable invention includes an industrial component, applications submitted are primarily in technological-industrial fields including electronics,
mechanics, computers, communications, and industrial chemistry—all
areas where men reign dominant. In contrast, in the United States‘ broader
regime, it can be seen that there are ―softer‖ fields such as biochemistry,
biology, and organic elements with a more significant female presence.103
It is clear that this higher percentage of female inventors cannot be maintained if the definition of a patent narrows the focus to machinetechnological-industrial elements.
F. The Case for Expanding the Definition of Patentable Invention
Recognition of general legal patent protection for ―female‖ innovations
will encourage progress and development in ―female‖ fields and subsequently increased efficiency by organizing untapped female markets. This
recognition will lead to the commercialization of additional activities in
those fields by encouraging smaller players in the market to create and generating a climate of accessibility that stimulates more women to invent.
The broadened protection will also act to foster cooperation between sectors with different gender characteristics. The long-term result will be an
improvement and enrichment of work accomplished by women inventors
available to the public.
Applying the globally prevalent rationale of promoting welfare only to
technological inventions discriminates against a majority of women who
are responsible for the welfare achieved through inventions in other nontechnical and ―non-machine‖ fields.104 Increasing patent protection is the
103. See BUTTONS TO BIOTECH, supra note 93, at 13 (―The three classes of technology having the highest share of woman-inventor patent grants in 1996 are (1) Chemistry:
Natural Resins or Derivatives; Peptides or Proteins; Lignins or Reaction Products
Thereof (27.8 percent); (2) Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology (26.4
percent); and (3) Organic Compounds, Class 548 (26.1 percent).‖); see also ISRAEL
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL STATISTIC INFORMATION ON THE PATENT, DESIGN AND
TRADEMARK ACTIVITIES: PATENT APPLICATIONS SORTED BY AREA YEAR 2004 (June 7,
2004), available at http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/EA739A38-EFCD-413C9A7B-A9D113C1492B/0/PTAPPAREA2004.bmp (providing statistics for seven categories of Israeli patent applications).
104. See MOY, supra note 50, at § 5:8 (discussing the limitations of the traditional
paradigm that defines patent-law). See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 49, at 263-64
(summarizing recent changes in intellectual property law); Chiappetta, supra note 43,
at 182-83 (arguing for the reassessment of normative differences implicit in TRIPS);
Porter, supra note 49, at 225-26 (theorizing that the American approach to business
method patents will obstruct uniformity with the world patent system). Criticism of the
patent system and its expansion claims that patent protection hampers development and
free competition of individuals and companies. See Biddinger, supra note 54, at 252326 (arguing against the patentability of business methods); Andrew R. Sommer,
Trouble on the Commons: A Lockean Justification for Patent Law Harmonization, 87 J.
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best legal way to protect women‘s inventions effectively and to bring them
to the same level as men. By going through alternative routes, i.e., suggesting other types of protection for women‘s activity, the level of protection
would not be the same as it would for a patent. Even if copyright protection proves coextensive (and has its own benefit as it lasts longer), the application of different type of protections to different genders will lead to the
separate and unequal protection to women.105
The broadened definition of an invention needs to be decided cautiously.
Inventions that are protected by patent law give their inventors significant
and exclusive rights. The free use of patents deprives the public, during the
term of exclusivity, and requires them to request a license and pay royalties
in order to use the invention. The result, if not carefully balanced, might be
paradoxical: the more we expand the definition of Eligible Patent Matter—
to further women‘s cause—the more we might limit the development of the
field we want to advance.106
It cannot be denied that moving the value of gender equality from the
margins of patent discourse to the center will have its price, but the proper
balance can be found between achieving real targets on the path to equality
in the field of inventions and the price incurred for that achievement. By
addressing and rehabilitating the current state of patent law with caution
and working to balance the needs of male and female inventors and the
rights of the public, a better, more gender-equal balancing point will be
achieved; one that, unlike the current state, serves everybody‘s interests
equally.
The conclusion cannot be avoided: perpetuating the current situation and
a definition of EPM that serves as beneficial only to one gender is inappropriate. The present state of patent law in many countries, by its definition,
discriminates against women, prevents the upward mobility of women, and
exacts a heavy social and economic price. The existing definition serves to
create and uphold an ever-growing male elite with economic power while
preventing growth and development of other non-technological fields that
are important to promoting welfare in society today.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 141, 142 (2005) (arguing that any expansion of patent
protection is detrimental to the public). But see Burk & Lemley, supra note 38, at
1205-06 (asserting that patent law should be more flexible, so as to include different
inventions).
105. See Nicholas A. Smith, Note, Business Method Patents and Their Limits: Justifications, History, and the Emergence of a Claim Construction Jurisprudence, 9 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 171, 184-85 (2002) (discussing the significance of disparate patent law approaches to business method).
106. Furthermore, a balance must be found otherwise it might become impossible to
enforce overbroad monopolistic rights to protect these inventions because they are used
so extensively in many areas of life. In the United States, such criticisms have emerged
in protest of expanding patent protection to include business methods.
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Only with the return of an egalitarian starting point will the current segregation between women‘s and men‘s occupations be understood, the importance of equality and women‘s contributions be internalized, and the
ability to formulate a more egalitarian definition of invention be possible.
G. Relevant Findings
The decision to define ―invention‖ in a technological-industrial manner,
as done in many countries, reflects a desire to promote welfare,107 innovation, and knowledge, primarily vis-à-vis technological and industrial inventions and patents.108 This criterion, however, is androcentric. When it was
―decided‖ to use these industrial terms as part of the definition of a protectable patent, it was known that the technological-industrial fields were (and
are) primarily controlled by men. By using a perspective based on a male
model, whether intentionally or otherwise, a decision with widespread and
international effects was made to adopt a ―masculine‖ characteristic as the
threshold condition for the legal creation of a patent.
Cultural feminism argues the necessity of considering the differences in
women‘s contributions to society and the inventing process and the need to
value them equally. Therefore, taking a critical look at current threshold
requirements means legal tests must be established using feminine traits in
addition to the already recognized masculine tests (innate or acquired, natural or attributed) and women must be granted the rights that, in this case,
originate in patent law.
Supporters of liberal equality respond that the definitions of ―invention‖
are open to all genders and represent an equal opportunity to all who wish
to participate; as such, women can integrate into technological systems and
create inventions. However, this claim fails to address the crux of the problem leading to the exclusion of women: the threshold and masculine criteria
that serve as the foundation of the definition of patents.
According to the radical feminist approach, the concept of equality does
not reflect two-sided equality between the sexes. The claims of so-called
equality are merely unidirectional. The meaning of ―equal‖ amounts to
―equal to a man.‖ Women are compared to men and not the opposite. In
order for women to be granted resources and rights, they need to prove, as
a threshold condition, that they have ―masculine‖ characteristics and, there107. See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and
The Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2003) (indicating how legal
tools are used to advance economic welfare).
108. Compare id. (addressing the use of patent law as a tool to promote the quantity
and quality of innovative products and hence enrich the welfare of the public), with
Sarnoff, supra note 25, at 15-17 (suggesting that the exclusion of ―traditional‖ women‘s work from patentable categories has benefitted society by contributing to a robust
public domain).
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fore, are entitled to the benefits granted to the male group. The liberal socalled equal opportunity does not consider the idea that women have their
own standards. Instead, women are effectively made to ask for rights that
they deserve from the beginning.109
Even if one remains unconvinced that the definition of a patent excludes
women inventors, the ideas discussed in this Article and the same rationale
can be applied to current statistics (discussed supra) to encourage equality
where equal footing has yet to be found. As explained above, the law
serves to create and perpetuate social gaps, but it also has the ability to
close them. Therefore, it is still possible to use legal definitions to correct
the gaps, even if their origin is unidentified. The solution, according to cultural feminist theory, is to ―rewrite‖ the criteria to include women‘s experiences and move toward granting them equal value. Placing genderequality as a value in the center of legal discourse will lead to more egalitarian criteria that also reflect the feminine voice. After making this change,
it will be possible to accommodate patent applications in new categories,
such as social, educational, psychological, and familial inventions, alongside the familiar categories of electronics, mechanics, and computers.
The exclusion of women transmits an antidemocratic message. Obstacles keeping women at a distance from potential access to resources and
power are an impediment on the way to achieving distributional justice.
Exclusion transmits a stereotypical and un-educational message that places
women in a disadvantaged position. Furthermore, exclusion leads to economic inefficiency by discouraging the advancement of entire fields and
not taking maximum advantage of human potential.
The integration of a new voice requires finding new words and creating
new methods.110 Additional research is required in order to identify fields
that can be included in the definitions of invention; however, opening the
―opportunity gate‖ to women inventors by changing the definitions to more
egalitarian ones is only the first stage. Once the definitions are rewritten,
women will be occupied with inventing, whether in the technological and
industrial fields prevalent today or in one of the other occupational areas
that will be included in the new legal definitions of ―invention‖ and ―inventor,‖ as proposed in this Article. Nevertheless, by changing the defined
terms alone, it is doubtful that these women will be awarded complete
property rights in their inventions. There is a second and essential stage
necessary to women‘s progress, which is examining the mechanisms that
109. See MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance, supra note 6, at 32-35 (noting
that there are two alternate paths to equality for women: either be the same as men or
be different from men).
110. See GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 1-4 (noting that there is a disparity between
women‘s experience and representation of human development in psychological and
literary texts, which has generally evinced a problem in women‘s development).
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ensure fair rights to women who develop inventions (such as, addressing
the issue of who is considered an ―inventor‖ for the purposes of allocating
property rights). This mechanism is discussed separately in a subsequent
article.
III. RETHINKING EPM: CONCLUSIONS
A. Is Patent Law Gender Blind?
Taking into consideration the insignificant number of women inventors,
the interesting question arises: how did relevant international law (influencing many legal systems) develop as if there are no women?
One of the explanations for the creation of legal mechanisms that exclude women from many fields is the use of androcentric criteria,111 meaning those rules and definitions are built on the basis of a masculine model.
Androcentric rules are built too narrowly and often exclude women‘s experience. The use of these criteria inevitably results in a model that is not
suited to women and perpetuates their exclusion from the distribution of
resources and other benefits that the model promotes.
The hurdles that must be overcome before putting reforms into place are
lofty. Exposing the androcentric structures is not simple. Historically, industrial intellectual property protection (patents) was distinguished from
the cultural intellectual property protection (copyright). Patent law was established to distinguish industrial, scientific, and conceptual discoveries
from cultural creations.112 The gender-bias is part of the historically categorization. Moreover, for centuries, both men and women have internalized the idea that these ideals are the appropriate standard of measure and
only justifiable criteria. Further, the only noticeable testimony to the need
for a critical examination of the principles is the resulting gender segregation and resultant discrimination. The causal relationship between the principles and the discriminatory result is not always clear. The absence of
negative intent, the lack of evidence for a masculine ―conspiracy‖ and other
values (advancement of science, technology, and economic welfare) that
justify the principles all hamper critical examination of the status quo. Finally, rescinding principles that are deeply rooted in the legal and economic
111. See id. at 62-63 (suggesting that society‘s hierarchical and gender based structure negatively impacts one‘s conception of the self); SANDRA LIPSITZ-BEM, THE
LENSES OF GENDER-TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL INEQUALITY 73-79 (1993)
(chronicling recent Supreme Court jurisprudence); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 106-26
(1979) (comparing two different theories concerning gender discrimination in the
American legal system).
112. See Sarnoff, supra note 25, at 38 (explaining that after the revolutionary law,
there was an effort to encourage the development of literature through copyright law).
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system, which have become foundation stones for the entire system over
the years, is considered impossible or unjustifiable.
Taking all this into account, it is apparent that fighting against discrimination barriers has its cost. In addressing the gender issues highlighted in
this Article, policy makers will have to decide, after considering the gender
aspects explicitly as an equal factor, whether they are willing to pay this
cost.113
As set forth above, among the various suspect legal principles, special attention should be paid to the definitions used. Definitions by their very nature are critical guardians with the political power to determine who is
permitted to enter a certain field (and benefit from its distributions). The
definitions at a threshold level determine who remains outside that field.
From this perspective, the definitions are even more important than the
other principles of distribution that apply to those who pass the definitions‘
filter.
This Article seeks to question the framework of discourse about intellectual property as lacking the important discussion focused on the imbalance
between genders, the reasons for that imbalance and the promotion of
gender equality. The Article relates to the laws of invention as a part of the
greater rubric of property law.
Research focusing on the distribution of power that emerges from property ownership relates to intellectual property law including patent law as
part of the comprehensive set. The main purpose of this Article is to draw
attention to existing problems because, without the explicit centralized recognition that the interpretation of property is a factor for promoting gender
equality, the legal-property discourse will continue to exclude women.
The dissonance between property laws and the principal of equality is
problematic. The solution is found in a new and different perspective on
intellectual property law—considering the legal mechanisms in place in the
context of gender as central to the discourse. Incorporation of equality discourse in the analysis of intellectual property laws will lead to the examination of the issue in the light of the following important questions: Are the
principles used for achieving intellectual property applied equally to men
and women? Do the definitions of intellectual property exclude women
from their application? What changes should be made in light of awareness of the principles of equality as they impact property discourse from its
center rather than the margins?114
113. Policy makers should consider the problem resulting from changing the patent
system in the effort to provide more fair and equal treatment to women and other
groups.
114. See Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV.
611, 637-41, 711-14 (1987) (elaborating on the free market model and the problems
with free market assumptions).
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While this Article focuses on the plight of women inventors, the legal
principles exclude not only women from property rights in their inventions
and patents, but also other groups.115 In other words, the same principles
which discriminate against women, also discriminate against other groups.
The solutions for all types of exclusion from patent rights can be similar.
Therefore, the discussion of women‘s exclusion will likely contribute to
dealing with the exclusion of other groups from the field of inventions.
The goal of this Article was inspired by Professor Gilligan‘s voice: ―My
goal is to expand the understanding of human development by using the
group left out in the construction of theory to call attention to what is missing in its account.‖116
B. Changing Existing Legal Structures
The legitimacy of the current definition of an ―invention‖ and who is an
―inventor‖ should be reconsidered from the perspective of the human
progress, which is inherent in the definition itself. The definitions should
be closely examined on the basis as to what extent the narrow definitions
eliminate the potential contributions of women.
The relevant definitions need to be changed via international treaties because the definition of ―invention‖ is derived from the definition in the
TRIPS Agreement and other international treaties. Further, international
recognition of the need for gender equality is a global issue. As noted, the
definition of invention is neither static nor unchangeable; it has been
changed in the past and is likely to change in the future on both international and local levels. Rethinking what is considered EPM in the United
States is also important. The discourse between the Supreme Court and
other courts, as discussed above, reveals different voices that cannot be ignored. The U.S. Legislature and Supreme Court should consider gender as
a main factor as they reshape relevant definitions.117

115. Women are a majority of the population. Advancing women in the field of invention as an international strategy is, first and foremost, a national, economic interest
because of the desire to enrich and advance the patent field. See H. Anne Kelly, A
Woman’s Place: Women’s Emerging Role in Technology, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC‘Y 412, 413 (―America‘s future will depend heavily upon the creative capacity
of women.‖). See generally European Comm‘n Directorate-Gen. for Research, She
Figures 2003: Women and Science Statistics and Indicators, Eur. 20733 (2003) (stating
results of a methodological study concerning the entry of women into scientific fields
in Europe); Carter-Ives, supra note 88, at 108 (discussing the contribution of black
women in American patent and trademark innovation).
116. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 3-4.
117. See Sarnoff, supra note 25, at 108-09 (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence
concerning the novelty and obviousness doctrines). Further research could inquire into
relationship between each component of the EPM demands and its discriminatory effect. The obviousness doctrine may have greater gender-discriminatory effects than a
simple novelty doctrine.
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C. Summary
The fact that a woman, Madame Curie, won the Nobel Prize—in physics
in 1903 and in chemistry in 1911—may mislead the public from the dismal
reality of women‘s true standing in the world of intellectual property. The
percentage of women inventors is minuscule. Marie Curie‘s success is an
exception to the norm.
The structures in place that perpetuate the division of gender roles lead
to unacceptable outcomes. The historical and ongoing exclusion of women
from recognition in the inventing process is not coincidental; their obscurity serves to distance women from power, resources, and status. Closer examination of the problem reveals that it need not be everlasting. The bias
can be corrected through both legal as well as social changes. We should
not forget that the legal system is the creation of humankind and is intended
to serve everyone under its auspices.
This Article offers a basis for reform that would promote gender equality
in the laws of invention. In the first stage, the broad definition as adopted
by the U.S. (in contrast to the narrow international definition) should be
adopted on an international level and by national legal systems. As such,
the main purpose of this study is to begin a dialogue and to include gender
as a legitimate consideration when shaping legal intellectual property principles. This is true also in relation to the U.S. patent legal system.
Integration of feminist insights about legally created hierarchical structures and the importance of integrating the ―other voice‖ into legal-property
arrangements will, if considered, lead to more egalitarian structures. Of
course, change cannot be expected to occur immediately nor can suggested
changes provide a solution for the current generation of women inventors
who find themselves tied to professions that lack prestige and proper compensation. The suggested changes can begin to ensure that future generations of women do not have to suffer the same inequalities. In an era of
growing awareness of equality between the sexes, as women‘s slowly
changing self-perception allows them to recognize their own strengths, the
time is ripe to reconsider and amend the law reflect these changes.
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